China's WTO flop

In July 2000, William Greider, writing in The Nation, heaped scorn on the NY Times ("bell cow for the media") and in particular: Thomas Friedman and Paul Krugman.

Amusingly, Greider writes:

Thomas Friedman's views on globalization, reiterated twice a week, are simple: "Shut up and eat your spinach. Globalization is good for you, even if you're too stupid to understand why. Besides, there's nothing you can do about it." He resolves complex disputes on large matters with words like "crazy" and "ridiculous," accusing globalization's critics of being "quacks" and "extremists." His colleague Paul Krugman relies on a loftier form of condescension. "Economists are smarter than most people, and I'm smarter than most economists. Anyone who disagrees is an unlicensed hack or a hired gun with an economics degree from a second-rate university." Regular readers of the Times can attest that my mild caricature does not exaggerate. (Greider's caricatures are dead-on accurate.)

Greider's complaints were swallowed up by 1.26 billion Chinese consumers needing McDonald's Happy Meals. As Thomas Friedman fondly reminded us, wars are not fought between McDonald franchises.

Indeed, the Mandarin Sispyhus, with the help of so many others, pushed their boulder to the lofty summit of WTO membership.

In December 2001, after an epic, 15-year struggle, the BBC News hailed a mighty achievement: China joins the WTO - at last. China's "Official Gateway" told us: "China's WTO membership is expected to promote the country's own reform...."

That was then, this is now. CEIP's Minxin Pei writing in the Taipei Times tells a very different story. Pei begins by reciting his well-learned catechism:

Most Westerners believe in a theory of liberal evolution, according to which sustained economic growth, by increasing wealth and the size of the middle class, gradually makes a country more democratic.

In ancient times, Zeus bowed to Fate. Later, Hegel bowed to "rational" progress in the history of men (The Philosophy of History). Like those that came before, Pei, Friedman, Fukuyama, and so many others believe there are unremitting and implacable Laws of History, for their philosophies have been shaped by blending Hegel, Darwin, and Spencer. And as we shall see from Pei's commentary, he bows to Marx's class struggle theory.

Today, Pei admits China's "liberal evolution" has stalled. Oddly, Pei suggests Heraclitus' stream has stopped flowing, or Hobbes' upward or downward motions have ceased. Not surprisingly, Pei is flummoxed. Pei tells us,

Instead of democratic transition, China has witnessed a consolidation of authoritarian rule. Since 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pursuing a two-pronged strategy: selective repression that targets organized political opposition and assimilation of new social elites.

This strategy emphasizes the maintenance of an extensive law enforcement apparatus designed to eliminate organized opposition. Huge investments have strengthened the People's Armed Police (PAP), a large anti-riot paramilitary force whose specialty is the quick suppression of anti-government protests by disgruntled industrial workers, farmers and urban residents. Frequent deployment of the PAP is a major reason why the tens of thousands of collective protests that occur each year (74,000 in 2004 and 86,000 last year) have had a negligible impact on China's overall stability.

Unmoved by facts, Pei clings to his "rational" theories and believes events will unfold as he has seen, while staring into his bowl of mead, for he tells us:

Although the CCP's carrot-and-stick approach has worked since 1989, it is doubtful that it will retain its efficacy for another 17 years.

... When things go wrong -- as is likely, given mounting social strains caused by rising inequality, environmental degradation, and deteriorating public services -- China's alienated masses could become politically radicalized.

... So it may be premature for the party to celebrate the success of its adaptive strategy. China's rulers may have stalled democratic trends for now, but the current strategy has, perhaps, merely delayed the inevitable.

Or Fukuyama's End of History creed was just so much idle nonsense?